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The increasing importance recognised to corporate governance, the shift from the 
dominance of the shareholder view to the prevalence of the stakeholder view, and the 
necessity to recover approval on companies’ actions have stressed the opportunity of 
complete disclosure about corporate governance structures and performances. 
The research is founded on an international comparison and is finalised to verify: 
the existence of principles and recommendations concerning the corporate 
governance communication; the real quality of corporate governance communication 
published by some companies, operating in the same sector but in different countries; 
the effort needful to reach a formal and substantial shared model of communication. 
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1. Stakeholder View and Corporate Governance Communication 
 
Corporate governance is nowadays widely discussed. This debate, begun at the 
end of the last century and still far from conclusion, is focalised on the search for 
optimal requirements of effectiveness, propriety and transparency. 
The studies on corporate governance have distant origins
1
, but a revision of 
governance principles from a global point of view has been just recently proposed, 
adopting a wide-ranging and shared approach of uniformity and contemporaneous 
respect of national peculiarities. This approach is based on a broad notion of 
responsibility and on a modern consideration of the links existing between the 
company’s durable success and the equitable composition of all stakeholders’ 
interests. 
The industrialised countries are today searching for optimal models of 
governance, characterised by reliability and transparency. Particularly, institutions, 
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scholars and firms tend to give emphasis to: governance decisions, which 
determine proper relations among resources, activities and performance; the ability 
to develop positive stakeholder relations, which is connected to governance 
decisions, actions and communications
2
. 
The increasing importance recognised to corporate governance, the shift from the 
dominance of the shareholder view to the prevalence of the stakeholder view, and 
the necessity to recover approval on companies’ actions have stressed the role of 
corporate communication. In particular, periodical, clear and complete disclosure 
about corporate governance structures and forms of actualisation seems to be 
suitable for this new situation
3
. 
In fact, the establishment of effective relationships with the stakeholders is 
strongly influenced by the ability to offer concrete, understandable, true and 
exhaustive answers to the stakeholders’ need of information. In this sense, the 
corporate governance evolution and the integrated concept of responsibility 
(considering legal, economic, social and environmental dimensions) have produced 
a selected enlargement of corporate communication. In recent years, in addition to 
the traditional financial disclosure, many other kinds of reporting have been 
divulged: the social report, the environmental report, the sustainability report, the 
corporate governance report, the directors and top managers’ remuneration report, 
the integrated report, etc. 
Moreover, new ways of information spreading have been sought in order to 
facilitate access to the messages and well-timed diffusion. In this regard, the 
development of ICT guarantees important help, permitting the firms to eliminate 
spatial and time barriers, to improve information symmetry among all the 
stakeholders and to accelerate international convergence. Especially, the existence 
of a corporate website section dedicated to investor relations (or stakeholder 
relations) ensures the availability of information that can be systematically updated 
by the company and consulted by each stakeholder. 
The demand for transparency and effectiveness of corporate governance 
communication is higher as concerns listed companies, because they involve wide 
financial interests; furthermore, their correct behaviour strengthens the legitimacy 
of national stock exchanges all over the world. In this regard, the market regulators 
of different countries have assumed a proactive role in the improvement of 
corporate disclosure. 
For some years, attention has been specifically focalised on the corporate 
governance report. This document contains details about: composition, 
appointment, remuneration and role of corporate governance bodies; the internal 
control systems supporting the governance; related parties transactions and 
potential collusions; confidential information handling, information symmetry and 
internal dealing; investor relations. 
Therefore, the corporate governance report tends to be an essential document for 
brief information on corporate governance structures and processes. Its publication 
is voluntary, although it is recommended by specific institutions, and it signals the 
directors’ orientation towards transparency and their intention to establish effective 
relationships with all the company stakeholders.  
Of course, recommendations promoted by the stock exchange regulators are not 
always respected by companies; moreover, the nature of initiatives to orient the 
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company behaviour and the actual level of implementation are really different from a 
country to another, even considering just the industrialised ones. Consequently, it is 
interesting to realise a comparison among Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, 
Spain, the United States of America and Japan, specifically finalised to verify: the 
existence of principles and recommendations concerning the corporate governance 
report; the real quality of corporate governance reports published by some companies, 
operating in the same sector but in different countries. 
In particular, the analysis regards eight electric firms, listed on the stock exchanges of 
the countries considered in the research. The selection of public utilities companies is 
due to the importance of corporate governance communication in their context. Indeed, 
it is fundamental for these firms to compose equally: on the one hand, protection of 
public interest connected to the nature of the services provided and sometimes to the 
role of the State as a stockholder; on the other hand, entrepreneurial autonomy and 
value creation in the interests of all the company stakeholders. Finally, the public utility 




2. Recommendations on Corporate Governance Communication 
 
The general interest in corporate governance communication, manifested by many 
institutions for market regulation and firm surveillance, has produced very different 
attitudes. Specific rules on corporate governance communication have been established 
worldwide, in order to facilitate the knowledge and evaluation of companies, especially 
of the listed ones. Nonetheless, the penetration of these rules in companies’ information 
systems is really diversified, partly as a consequence of the level of detail adopted by 
the promoting institutions in their recommendations. Furthermore, today it is still quite 
difficult to compare corporate governance communications of companies from different 
countries; moreover, there is significant diversity in each national context too. 
Three major approaches have been used by regulators all over the world to 
influence the corporate governance communication of listed companies and, 
indirectly, of all other firms that want to be transparent. Indeed, a survey of 
different countries permits distinguishing among (Table 1): 
a) countries with formal and substantial recommendations to orient companies 
in drawing up their corporate governance reports; 
b) countries where regulators indicate the most important information on 
corporate governance that companies should detail in their financial report 
(typically, in the annual report);  
c) countries where neither special recommendations about an independent 
corporate governance report exist, nor a specific chapter on corporate 
governance is required in the annual report. 
 
Italy and Spain are two of the countries with formal and substantial 
recommendations concerning the corporate governance report. In both countries, 
listed companies are expected to publish all relevant details on their corporate 
governance in a specific annual document, following a pre-established outline
4
. 
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France, Great Britain and the United States give larger autonomy to the 
companies with reference to corporate governance communication: stock exchange 
regulators and surveillance authorities define only the essential information that 
must complete financial reports or other mandatory documents (the reference 
document, the annual report and the proxy statement
5
). 
Finally, interest in corporate governance communication does not seem to be as 
high in Germany and Japan as in the previous countries: there are neither specific 
recommendations for an independent report nor a list of details on corporate 
governance to be inserted in the annual report
6
. 
With reference to the board of directors functioning, all the countries with 
specific recommendations require a complete description of internal committees
7
, 
as regards composition, powers and meetings. However, there are also national 
peculiarities: for instance, the United States privilege the communication on the 
audit committee, while in the other countries this is just one of the bodies that 
companies should illustrate. 
The countries investigated in this research usually require firms to divulge an 
annual self-assessment concerning the board of directors activity; in some cases 
(France and the United States) this evaluation is also accompanied by the opinion 
of a company’s control body. 
Regarding the remuneration system for directors and executive officers, Spain 
pays higher attention than Italy: indeed, the corporate governance report of Spanish 
companies must describe the rules for compensation assignment, as well as details 
on the global compensation paid to each category of directors. These same types of 
information must be also published by French companies, which must indicate the 
individual remunerations too. On the contrary, compensation reporting is not 
expressly included in the guidelines on corporate governance communication of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Recommendations on investor relations determine some uniformity of behaviour, 
but differences in corporate governance communication. 
As concerns the countries with specific recommendations on corporate governance 
disclosure, it is possible to identify some topics that are considered fundamental in 
order to guarantee transparency on direction and control principles, structures and 
processes. However, national events can produce diverse emphasis on different 
aspects of corporate governance: in this regard, the United States are an interesting 
example, because their recommendations on corporate governance communication 
tend mostly to warrant a proper description of the company’s internal control system 
and to assure the financial disclosure reliability
8
. 
First of all, the corporate governance communication should clarify the composition 
of governance and control bodies, their functioning and compensation. 
With reference to governance structures, Italy and Spain require in-depth 
information in the corporate governance report about the board of directors or the 
management board, with personal details (as the members’ names), as well as the 
type of charge (outside directors, independent directors), roles, delegation of 
powers, meetings, etc. The French recommendations are also detailed, even if 
companies are not obliged to publish a separate report.  
Recommendations of Great Britain and the United States are less strict: for 
instance, British listed firms should disclose just the most important directors’ and 
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officers’ names (chairman, CEO, lead independent director
9
, etc.) and explain how 
the non-executive directors become conscious of the stakeholders’ expectations; 
instead, US companies have to pay attention to the role of independent director and 
favour the dialogue among the chairman, the directors and the stakeholders. 
The spread of information on internal control and risk management is strongly 
recommended by all the countries analysed in this study, which sometimes also 
require the audit committee or the board of directors to realise and publish an 
evaluation of the internal procedures’ effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, 
US firms should describe their code of ethics, that is to say an essential internal 
control instrument to orient directors’ and officers’ behaviour and particularly 
direct to persons responsible for the financial disclosure. 
Proper corporate governance is based on the equitable treatment of all 
expectations converging into the firm. In this regard, the external communication 
should demonstrate that no member of the company’s bodies or relevant 
shareholder has directly or indirectly taken advantage from commercial, financial 
or asset-involving operations in which the company has been the counterpart. 
Nevertheless, only Italy, Spain and France recommend companies to explain 
related parties transactions in their corporate governance disclosure. 
The functioning of the general meeting of shareholders should be comprehensively 
illustrated, with details on the procedures for improving shareholder participation (for 
example, by means of web conference calls) and proxy voting. Italian and Spanish 
recommendations are the most detailed on these issues. 
Many other elements can be divulged in order to better the effectiveness of listed 
companies’ corporate governance communication, although not all the regulators 
and supervisors provide for them; moreover, these further details can be differently 
arranged in relation to how corporate governance systems are actualised in each 
country. For instance:  
- Italian recommendations on the corporate governance report consider also 
the board of auditors
10
 and promote transparency on the procedures for 
confidential information handling; 
- Spanish companies are required to explain their ownership structure;  
- French firms should clarify which principles inspire their strategies of 
communication to the financial market, especially towards analysts and the 
specialised press; 
- in Great Britain, directors and statutory auditors must produce a declaration 
concerning accounting procedures and checks on their correctness; moreover, 
the statutory auditor independence must be reaffirmed if the auditors offer also 
consultancy to the company; 
- finally, US firms must state that they have adopted an internal code of 
corporate governance, which must be prepared by each company with 
autonomy, but respecting the generally accepted practices of corporate 
governance. 
 
It is interesting to underline that Italian, French, British, German and Spanish 
firms are also influenced by EU directives, so their corporate governance 
communication could acquire higher uniformity in the future. Modifications of the 
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current situation could be produced by possible changes of ownership, agreements 
and M&A involving different stock exchanges. 
 
Table 1: Recommendations on Corporate Governance Disclosure: an 
International Comparison 
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The law (‘KonTraG’) only demands an annual 
declaration of compliance of the corporate 
governance system with the model provided by 
the German corporate governance code, and that 




There aren’t recommendations about corporate 
governance disclosure. The Japanese corporate 
governance code (April 2004) generically 
stimulates companies to be transparent in their 














Particularly, the 2004/913/EC recommendation stimulates the information on the 
remuneration of a listed company directors. In this recommendation, the European 
Commission establishes that each EU member state must fix the most adequate rules 
for the communication of compensation, as well as for its composition; this latter is 
the result of mixing fixed components with variable ones (in connection to the 
achievement of corporate or individual goals, and sometimes represented by stock 
grants and stock options). Each state can require a new specific remuneration 
statement or the insertion of the above-mentioned information in an existent 
document
11
, as the corporate governance report or the annual report, whose section 
on management discussion and analysis already contains some details on directors’ 
and officers’ remunerations. 
The previous considerations permit us to affirm that different recommendations 
exist in diverse countries, even if they belong to the European Union and they are 
characterised by similar corporate governance systems as concerns the exercise of 
control on the company (‘outsider systems’ or ‘insider systems’) and the relations 





□ The distinction between outsider and insider systems derives from the 
two types of control on management and company results: from the 
outside, through efficient financial markets, or from the inside, by means 
of persons interested in maintaining a durable relationship with the firm. 
The outsider system (or market-oriented system) is typical of economic 
contexts with a lot of listed corporations, whose ownership is highly 
fragmented and diffuse and where the shareholders’ interests can conflict 
with the managers’ interests: indeed, these two categories tend not to 
agree, since investors aren’t interested in governing the company, being 
instead attracted by dividends and value creation. The outsider system is 
effective when both corporate governance bodies and investors behave 
correctly and ethically, and when investors can contest the control of the 
company with the current shareholders buying their stocks on the 
financial market.  
On the contrary, insider systems are characterised by scarcely 
developed financial markets, concentrated and stable shareholding, 
cross-holding and other important financial relationships between firms 
and banks. In such contexts, it is essential to control the management 
from the inside, because the stickiness of financial markets – where only a 
small part of the firm equity is traded – does not permit takeovers and the 
consequent substitution of managers. In the insider systems, managers 
are therefore controlled by a corporate body appointed by the most 
relevant stakeholders, selected on the grounds of their risk exposure and 
the importance of the resource they have conferred to the company.  
However, historic and economic events of the countries with an insider 
system have contributed to the development of two partially different 
forms. Despite of the mentioned common features, we can distinguish 
between: the Rhine insider system, characterised by strong participation 
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to the control activity by banks and employees; the Latin insider system, 
where managers are controlled by the major shareholder thanks to his 
influence on the board of directors. 
 
As regards the distribution of powers among the corporate bodies, the governance 
systems can have one or two levels. Generally speaking, direction and control 
activities should be assigned to different bodies or persons, in order to provide 
stronger guarantees of equitable satisfaction of all the stakeholders’ expectations. 
 
□ National laws and codes of best practices offer diverse solutions 
concerning the separation of direction and control functions. In fact, it is 
possible to identify: 
1) corporate governance systems in which the powers of direction and 
control are assigned to different persons belonging to the same body 
appointed by the shareholders: these systems are named ‘one-tier 
systems’ or ‘unitary systems’; 
2) corporate governance systems with two separate bodies: one 
exercising the direction function, and the other exercising the control 
function. Even if the two bodies are formally divided, they interact when 
the control body realises its supervision on the direction body, and 
sometimes gives it specific guidelines. The rules of body appointment (as 
described in the continuation) let us adopt the expressions ‘dual system’ 
and ‘two-tier system’. 
 
As concerns the countries investigated in this article, the US corporate governance 
system and the British one are similar, since they are both outsider systems. 
Moreover, US and British companies are directed and controlled by a unitary body, 
the board of directors, which is mostly composed of non-executive and independent 
directors with orientation, supervision and control responsibilities. In the other 
European countries, as well as in Japan, the high influence of specific stakeholder 
categories on the establishment of stable majorities, compared with the weak role of 
financial markets, has determined the development of insider systems of corporate 
governance. 
The allocation of powers to corporate bodies can be anyway very different, 
sometimes among companies of the same country too. 
 
□ Spain is characterised by a one-tier system, where powers are 
attributed to the board of directors (‘consejo de administración’). This 
body comprises diverse types of directors, among whom the direction and 
surveillance functions are divided: the executive directors, the 
proprietary ones and the independent ones. 
 
□ In France, companies can adopt the one-tier system (the most diffused 
one) or the two-tier system. In the case of one-tier system, the 
shareholders appoint the board of directors (‘conseil d’administration’), 
with direction and control functions. The board is led by an executive 
chairman (named ‘président-directeur général’, PDG), who exercises 
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wide managerial powers and represents the company in external 
relationships. In the case of two-tier system, the shareholders appoint the 
supervisory board that is responsible for watching over the management. 
Direction is assigned to the executive board (‘directoire’) and its 
president, both nominated by the supervisory board.  
 
□ Germany is characterised by the two-tier system; the ‘Aufsichtsrat’ 
and the ‘Vorstand’ are respectively the supervisory board and the 
management board. Their composition is established by law in order to 
guarantee that the most important categories of stakeholders are 
adequately represented. Indeed, the supervisory board is appointed by the 
shareholders and the employees. Banks take part directly in the 
nomination procedure too, because they are shareholders of the company 
and they also vote by proxy, instead of their customers (composed of 
small savers). Therefore, the supervisory board should provide general 
protection to all expectations converging into the firm, which is 
considered as a social organisation. The supervisory board appoints and 
removes the management board, whose activities it formally and 
substantially verifies. 
 
□ In Italy, the law provides for three corporate governance models, in 
the light of the companies law reform of 2003: the traditional dual model 
and two new ones (the one-tier model and the two-tier model).  
In the traditional model – still the most adopted today – the board of 
directors and the board of auditors exercise administrative and control 
functions respectively. Since these bodies are separate and both 
appointed by the shareholders, the Italian traditional system of corporate 
governance can be considered as a ‘dual horizontal system’. 
In the one-tier system, all powers are assigned to the board of directors. 
Anyway, surveillance is especially conducted by non-executive and 
independent members. 
In the two-tier system, the shareholders appoint the supervisory board 
that in turn nominates the management board: the two bodies are totally 
separate and develop different functions. A peculiarity of the Italian two-
tier model is that, unlike the German case, it does not provide for 
employee involvement in appointing the supervisory board. 
 
□ In Japan, since 2003 companies have been free to choose between the 
traditional system of corporate governance (similar to the Italian 
traditional one) and the one-tier ‘committee system’. In the Japanese 
traditional system, the shareholders appoint the board of directors, led by 
an executive president (named ‘shacho’), and the board of auditors 
(named ‘kansayaku’). In the one-tier committee system the shareholders 
appoint the board of directors, charged with all the powers; the board of 
directors establishes three proposing and consultative internal 
committees concerning audit, remuneration and nomination. 
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In all the systems described, external statutory auditors ascertain the validity and 
reliability of financial information. In the case of listed companies, this task is 
attributed to an audit firm. 
 
Certainly, recommendations stimulate the improvement of corporate governance 
disclosure. The existence of well-structured and detailed instructions induce the firms 
– particularly, the listed companies – to arrange and spread messages that are at least 
consistent with the required ones. 
However, even in the presence of instructions, the effectiveness of corporate 
governance communication tends to depend on the culture that characterises the 
corporate governance bodies, with specific reference to transparency. In this regard, it 
is relevant to analyse the actual behaviour of companies operating in the above-
mentioned countries, in order to verify: 
- the usefulness of recommendations on corporate governance disclosure; 
- the communication on corporate governance existing in fact. 
 
 
3. Corporate Governance Communication 
 
The effectiveness of corporate governance communication depends on the firms’ 
choices within laws and recommendations existing in their own operational 
environment. Therefore, it is interesting to compare some homogeneous companies 
of the above-mentioned countries. 
As introduced in paragraph 1, this analysis considers eight of the major energy 
listed firms. More exactly, two of them are listed on the Italian stock exchange, and 
each of the others is listed on the national financial market of its own country: Spain, 
France, Great Britain, Germany, the US and Japan. Each company should 
consequently respect a specific corporate governance code, as requested by its stock 
exchange. 
The selection of energy sector is justified not only by the typical characters of 
public utilities companies, but also by the dimensions of these firms, which often 
operate abroad and raise capital in foreign markets too. This increases the 
relationships of the companies with their stakeholders and imposes to satisfy wider 
information expectations. Moreover, in some countries the energy firms have been 
recently involved in privatisation and listing processes, which have deeply modified 
the corporate governance system, the role of the former public owner, as well as the 
manner of managing external approvals. 
The analysis of the corporate governance communication refers to the aspects 
described in paragraph 2 as common to all the corporate governance codes; the same 
are considered in the recommendations promoting the improvement of corporate 
governance disclosure. Furthermore, the research aims at verifying the existence of 
detailed information related to country peculiarities. 
The Table 2 contains the list of companies and the documents analysed for each of 























Enel Italy Italy, USA Corporate governance report 
Edison Italy Italy Corporate governance report 
Iberdrola Spain Spain Corporate governance report 
Eléctricité de France 
(EDF) 
France France Document de référence 
British Energy Group 
(BEG) 
Great Britain Great Britain Annual report 
Aquila USA USA Proxy statement, Annual report 
RWE Germany Germany Annual report 
Chubu Japan Japan Annual report 
 
Edison is a particular case in the group of companies: indeed, this firm has Italian 
origins, but it is currently controlled by Italian and French shareholders
13
 that have 
defined the rules of corporate governance by means of a shareholders’ agreement. 
The agreement – which is briefly described in Edison corporate governance report – 
follows the fundamental rules of the Italian code of corporate governance. 
 
The most important results of the investigation are illustrated below. 
 
a) Introduction to the Corporate Governance System and Adoption of the 
Code of Best Practice 
 
Brief and immediate information can be very helpful for foreign stakeholders, 
whose knowledge about corporate governance in other countries could be limited. In 
a similar way, firms should clearly indicate the system they have adopted when the 
law lets them choose among two or more, as in Italy, France and Japan. In this regard, 
the two Italian companies and the French one offer adequate information in the initial 
part of their report, specifying the adoption of the traditional Italian system and the 
one-tier system respectively; on the contrary, the Japanese company is really vague as 
concerns its horizontal dual system, characteristic of the country (Table 3). All other 
firms have implemented their typically national corporate governance system. 
Each firm – except Chubu – states the compliance with the corporate governance 
code and/or the law of its own country of origin, or with the rules adopted in other 
countries where the company is listed (as in the case of Enel) or holds a significant 
commercial position. Chubu specifies only the key elements for the improvement 
of its corporate governance structures and procedures, adopting an approach based 
















Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
35 
Table 3: Introduction to the Corporate Governance System and Adoption of the 




 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Declaration of the corporate 
governance system 
x x  x     
References to the law or to 
codes of best practices 
x x x x x x x  
Declaration of compliance 
with the codes 
x x x x x x x  
 
 
b) The Board of Directors 
 
Information on the board of directors (or the management board, in the case of the 
German firm RWE) is differently structured in the documents analysed (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Information on the Board of Directors Composition and Members 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Members’ names x x x x x x x x 
Members’ CV x  x x x x   
Expiry (or duration) of 
mandate 
x x  x x x   
Highest/lowest number of 
members 
x x x     x 
Executive and non-executive 
directors 
x x x  x x   
Independent directors x x x  x x   
Directors’ roles and tasks x x x x     
Other positions held x x x x x x x  
 8 7 7 5 6 6 2 2 
 
The unique detail given by all the companies is the composition of the board of 
directors. Eléctricité de France and Enel publish further information about 
appointment, specifying which directors have been nominated by the State: indeed, 
even if these companies have been privatised, the State still holds relevant shares of 
capital (more than 70% in the French firm and more than 30% in the Italian one). 
Eléctricité de France underlines its duty to appoint one or two directors coming from 
political institutions, even local, or chosen among experts in energy issues. Enel 
reminds the power of the State – never exercised until now – to appoint one further 
director, without rights of vote, as established by the Italian privatisation law and the 
company by-law. 
Individual details about directors are rare: in fact, three companies (Edison, RWE 
and Chubu) omit to publish the CV in the corporate governance report or in the 
specific section of the annual report
16
.  
The disclosure is often incomplete in relation to the mandate expiry or duration 
(indicated by five companies out of eight) and the highest and lowest number of 
directors (specified by four firms, including the Japanese one that has fixed at twenty 
members the ideal dimension of the board in order to promote an effective dialogue). 
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As concerns the capacity of non-executive director and independent director, 
some more details should be disclosed
17
. Particularly, the information divulged by 
Eléctricité de France can be improved with reference to independence: indeed, the 
firm declares that it has adopted different criteria of independence respect to the 
ones established in the French code of best practice, but it does not describe them. 
On the opposite, Iberdrola pays attention in communicating the capacity of each 
director, distinguishing between executive and non-executive members and 
classifying these latter as proprietary directors, independent directors and others, 
and it also explains the reasons: this richness of details is promoted by the 
recommended outline of corporate governance report. 
All the companies, with the exception of Chubu, give information about the 
positions assumed by their directors in other firms or organisations, according to 
the best practice in order to clarify interlocking directorships. 
The communication about the functioning of the board is shown in the Table 5. 
Some of the documents analysed (British Energy Group, Aquila, RWE and 
Chubu) are often defective in relation to the information about powers and 
functions of the board of directors and its members. Enel, Edison, Iberdrola and 
Eléctricité de France pay instead attention to these details, in particular as concerns 
the chairman and CEO (who are sometimes the same person). It is interesting that 
three of the mentioned companies have to publish their corporate governance report 
on the basis of specific recommendations. 
As regards the board meetings, all the firms subject to recommendations disclose 
the number of meetings and the attendance of each director. Consistently with the 
recommendations, the two Italian companies are the most careful, specifying also 
that the board of auditors and a magistrate of the Court of Accounts (in the case of 
Enel) take part in the board meetings. 
 
Table 5: Information on the Functioning of the Board of Directors 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Board’s functions and powers x x x x     
Directors’ tasks and 
responsibilities 
x x x x     
Board’s exclusive 
responsibilities 
 x  x x    
Board’s right to be informed by 
managing directors and the 
executive committee 
x  x x     
Number/frequency of meetings x x x x x x   
Attendance at meetings x x x x x x   
Abstention from specific 
decisions 
x x x  x     
 6 6 6 6 4 2 0 0 
 
Just four companies (from Italy, Spain and Great Britain) give information on the 
directors’ duty of abstention from voting in decisions on related parties transactions 
that involve their personal interests, as well as in decisions concerning their 
remuneration. 
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The information on internal committees charged with tasks of giving advice and 
making proposals varies according to the nature of each committee. Anyway, all 
the companies tend to communicate the committees’ composition, number of 
meetings, attendance and powers
18
, but they rarely describe the activities the 
committee has actually realised in the year. This is valid for the expressly 
recommended committees (executive, nomination, remuneration and audit), but 
also for the others
19
. The Italian firms pay usually more attention to internal 
committees than the other companies. 
The nomination committee (Table 6) exists in three firms, all characterised by the 
one-tier system (British Energy Group, Aquila and Iberdrola
20
). Considering the 
companies without a nomination committee, Edison explains that it is not necessary 
since the board of directors appointment is regulated by a shareholders’ agreement, 
described in the corporate governance report
21
. Other four firms illustrate their 
nomination procedure, as requested in their national recommendations. 
More details have been disclosed as concerns the remuneration committee (Table 
7). Eléctricité de France offers a description of this committee, although it did not 
function in 2005: indeed, the company declares that the remuneration committee 
will start to operate in 2006. 
Chubu is the only firm in the report of which there is no information on the 
remuneration committee. However, the reason could be that the traditional Japanese 
system of corporate governance does not provide for internal committees. 
 





 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Description of appointment 
procedure 
x x x  x x   
Existence of the nomination 
committee 
  x  x x   
Composition    x  x x   
Number of meetings   x  x x   
Attendance     x    
Powers    x  x x   
Activities actually realised         
 1 1 5 0 6 5 0 0 
 
Table 7: Information on the Remuneration Committee 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Existence of the remuneration 
committee 
x x x  x x x  
Composition  x x x  x x x  
Number of meetings x x x  x x x  
Attendance x x   x    
Powers  x x x  x x   
Activities actually realised x x   x  x  
 6 6 4 0 6 4 4 0 
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The executive committee prevails in non-Italian companies, where it can also 
operate as a strategic and investment committee. The most diffused details regard 
its composition and powers (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Information on the Executive Committee 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Existence of the executive 
committee 
  x x x x x  
Composition    x x x x x  
Number of meetings   x   x x  
Attendance         
Powers    x x  x x  
Activities actually realised       x  
 0 0 4 3 2 4 5 0 
 
To conclude about the board of directors, it is important to stress that British 
Energy Group, Iberdrola and Enel inform on the periodical self-assessment 
conducted by their board: in various countries, it is recommended that the 
evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency is reported to the shareholders and the 
other stakeholders. Among the mentioned firms, Iberdrola offers the most careful 
description of persons and procedures analysed in the evaluation. 
 
c) Control Bodies and the Internal Control System 
 
Corporate governance systems are characterised by the role of control bodies, as 
determined by laws, codes of best practices and stock exchange regulations. 
Different levels of control involve many internal and external bodies, appointed by 
the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors. 
The analysis of the disclosure on this theme has to consider the national 
peculiarities of each country, as well as the choices made by every firm within the 
corporate governance models permitted by the law.  
First of all, a distinction among the two-tier system, the dual horizontal system 
and the one-tier system is necessary.  
In the two-tier system of RWE the supervisory board plays the central role in 
corporate governance. This is clear in the company’s communication: the firm 
starts its corporate governance chapter of the annual report introducing the 
supervisory board composition, its functions and activities. Moreover, RWE 
reminds that its supervisory board realises a periodical self-evaluation as requested 
by the code of best practices. 
In the dual horizontal system, which is traditionally adopted in Italy and Japan, 
the shareholders’ meeting appoints the board of auditors charged with functions of 
control on direction, organisational structures and internal procedures. Enel and 
Edison give effective information about their board of auditors composition, 
powers, meetings and nomination procedure. Enel stresses also that two members 
have been appointed on the basis of a ministerial suggestion, while Edison 
underlines the existence of the still mentioned shareholders’ agreement
23
, which 
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establishes the nomination procedure for the board of auditors. On the contrary, 
Chubu does not publish details on its board of auditors. 
In the one-tier system of the other five companies, control is realised by the board 
of directors, particularly by the non-executive members. Nevertheless, the firms do 
not emphasise this function of board of directors in their reports, expect for 
mentioning that external directors meet in executive sessions. 
Generally speaking, internal control is sufficiently analysed in the companies’ 
documents on corporate governance, that include also information on risk 
management and internal audit. It probably depends on the relevance that codes of 
best practices and recommendations give to internal control and risk management. 
These documents establish that the board of directors (or the supervisory board) 
should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of internal control systems, with the 
support of the audit committee and with the co-operation of external consultants. 
However, just four companies inform about the evaluation of their internal control 
system (Eléctricité de France, British Energy Group, Aquila and RWE). Moreover, 
British Energy Group and Enel specify they have adapted their internal control 
system to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions. 
All the firms – except Chubu – pay attention to the audit committee in their 
corporate governance communication, usually indicating its composition
24
, the way 
of functioning (meetings and interaction with other control bodies), powers and 
tasks; on the contrary, the activities that the audit committee has realised in the year 
are rarely described. 
Only Edison and Eléctricité de France underline that the audit committee refers to 
the board of directors (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Information on the Internal Control systems (ICS) and the Audit Committee 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
ICS evaluation    x x x x  
ICS objectives x x x x     
Responsibility on ICS x x x x x x   
Major risks and risk management   x x x x x  
Existence of the audit committee x x x x x x x  
Composition x x x  x x x  
Number of meetings x x x x x x x  
Attendance x x  x x    
Powers and functions  x x x x x x x  
Activities actually realised x x  x  x x  
Persons/bodies to whom the 
committee reports 
 x  x     
 8 9 7 10 8 8 7 0 
 
As regards internal control, Enel and Edison also disclose details about the 
organisational, management and control model required by the Italian law on 
corporate criminal liability (legislative decree 231 of 2001), even if the Italian 
guidelines on corporate governance communication do not provide for this kind of 
information; furthermore, the Italian code of corporate governance has considered the 
organisational, management and control model as from the 2006 edition. 
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Finally, details on statutory auditors are often disclosed with reference to extra-
audit services; three companies (Edison, Iberdrola and Aquila) specify also the 
compensation paid to the auditors. 
 
d) Transactions Involving Private Interests of Directors and Officers  
 
The corporate governance communication should emphasise proper behaviour of 
directors and officers in the case of transactions determining a conflict of interests 
for them (Table 10). This is the case of related party transactions and internal 
dealing, that is to say respectively operations that can produce direct or indirect 
benefits for the director or the officer who realises them, and trading in company’s 
stocks thanks to confidential information. 
 
Table 10: Disclosure on Transactions Involving Related Parties, Handling of 
Confidential Information and Internal Dealing 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Transactions involving 
related parties 
        
List of operations   x x x  x  
Definition of related party    x      
Procedure to be followed by 
the board of directors for 
deliberating 
x x x      
Handling of confidential 
information 
        
Description of the procedure  x x      
Addressees of the procedure 
and their tasks and 
responsibilities 
   x     
Internal dealing         
Definition (or indication) of 
people submitted to specific 
rules (‘relevant individuals’) 
x x       
Operations submitted to 
disclosure duties 
x x     x  
Existence of company’s 
internal dealing code 
 x  x     
Block periods and monetary 
limitations 
 x  x     
 3 6 4 4 1 0 2 0 
 
Italian and Spanish firms should inform the stakeholders about related party 
transactions, by means of their corporate governance report, as recommended. In this 
regard, the documents of Enel, Edison and Iberdrola contain satisfactory details on 
the internal procedure adopted for related party transactions: directors in actual or 
potential conflict of interests with the firm have usually to explain their position to 
the board of directors and then they should abstain from voting. The other companies 
tend to inform on related party transactions just from a financial point of view, 
inserting details in the notes to the financial statements. RWE underlines that no 
related party transaction has been conducted during the year. 
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Edison, Enel and Iberdrola, together with Eléctricité de France, are the most 
careful companies in describing also: 
- their procedures for confidential information handling; 




e) Remuneration Systems 
 
Communicating directors’ and officers’ remuneration helps clarify how the resources 
produced by the company are divided among the stakeholders; moreover, this kind of 
information stresses risks and opportunities of the connection between the firm’s 
purpose of value creation and the directors’ and officers’ personal interests. Indeed, the 
description of fix and variable compensation components is useful to clear up how the 
company motivates directors and officers. 
The research has discovered moderate attention to the remuneration reporting 
(Table 11): just Chubu and Enel neglect this issue. In this regard, it is important to 
underline that the Italian guidelines on the corporate governance report require a 
general description of the remuneration system, but no details on the compensation 
level
26
; however, a firm such as Enel, which is listed on the NYSE too, should 
communicate better, even on the grounds of the European recommendation that 
should come into force in 2006. 
 
Table 11: Information on the Remuneration System 
 
 
The information on individual compensation of directors and officers is disclosed 
by five companies (the exceptions are Enel, Chubu and Iberdrola) and is well-
structured, with indication of fix and variable components, benefits and sometimes 
pension plans. In particular, five out of the six firms with bonus payments and profit 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Cash remuneration         
Global remuneration of 
directors and top managers 
  x x     
Individual remuneration of 
directors and top managers 
 x  x x x x  
Bonus payments and profit 
sharing 
 x x x x x x  
Stock grants and stock 
options plans 
        
Number of shares and options 
held by directors and top 
managers 
 x x x x x x  
Information on shares and 
options assigned, exercised 
and non-exercised in 2005 
 x    x   
Other compensations         
Remuneration from other 
companies of the Group 
 x x      
Pension or retirement plans     x x   
 0 5 4 4 4 5 3 0 
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sharing explain the criteria adopted to assign the variable parts of the remuneration
27
 
when pre-established corporate or individual targets are achieved. 
The allocation of stock grants and stock options to executive directors and 
officers is a common practice, but the communication can be still improved as 
concerns the conditions of stock options exercising (time, price, etc.). 
 
f) The Ownership Structure, the General Meeting of Shareholders and 
Investor Relations 
 
Corporate governance communication should inform the stakeholders on the 
ownership structure and the existence of relevant shareholders. However, the Spanish 
recommendations expressively require companies to insert these details in their 
corporate governance report: in this regard, Iberdrola has indeed a complete report. 
Information on how the general meeting of shareholders operates and how the 
company interacts with shareholders and investors by means of a professional 
investor relations department is recommended only by the Italian guidelines. In fact, 
non-Italian firms do not publish satisfactory information on these themes: they 
usually just mention their corporate website as a means of contact with investors and 
other stakeholders (Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Information on The General Meeting of Shareholders and Investor 
Relations (IR) 
 
 Enel Edison Iberdrola EDF BEG Aquila RWE Chubu 
Voting procedures x  x x  x x  
Shareholders’ agreements x x x x     
IR objectives x x       
IR actual activities  x x      
Information about the 
company’s website as a means 
of interaction with the 
stakeholders  
x x x x x x x  
 4 4 4 3 1 2 2 0 
 
Companies pay higher attention to voting procedures in the general meeting of 
shareholders, even if three of them (Edison, British Energy Group and Chubu) do 
not mention on-line voting and proxy voting. 
As concerns shareholders’ agreements, three firms declare not to know their existence, 
while Edison publishes some abstracts of them in its corporate governance report. 
 
 
4. Emerging Issues 
 
The research permits us to deepen some relevant issues concerning the 
effectiveness of corporate governance communication and its possible evolution, 
although few countries and companies have been considered. 
First, the analysis of laws, recommendations and company behaviour stress that 
we are still far from a formal and substantial shared model of communication. 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
43 
Particularly, the attention to corporate governance communication seems to be 
inhomogeneous and little connected to the economic development of a country. In 
this regard, it is important to underline the case of Germany and Japan, which have 
shown until now very little interest in promoting corporate governance 
communication. Besides, the corporate governance report is recommended only in 
Italy and Spain, and what’s more by means of non-mandatory guidelines that are 
exclusively addressed to listed companies. 
Anyway, the awareness of the role of corporate governance for durable trust-
based relationships and positive interaction between the firm and its stakeholders is 
recent, and it has been sometimes accelerated by episodes of fraud and research of 
private benefits, trampling on proper principles of transparency and social equity 
(Enron, WorldCom, Merck, Cirio, Parmalat, Vivendi, etc.). 
The corporate communication is still changing and in the future there could be 
higher uniformity of conduct on an international scale. This prediction seems to be 
confirmed by the increasing globalisation of financial markets and the modifying 
ownership structures of national stock exchanges, sometimes as a consequence of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Higher international uniformity of corporate governance communication is 
anyhow desirable; at this moment, however, it is still difficult to identify possible 
steps, because of the scanty international co-operation on this issue. Moreover, 
different conducts could be adopted: for example, a common model of corporate 
governance communication could be established for the largest companies, which 
involve relevant economic interests; alternatively, specific models for different 
countries could be developed, but they should all be based on shared rules and 
principles of transparency and stakeholder protection. 
Anyway, more intensive international co-operation would be helpful, in order to 
reflect the current globalisation of markets and information in the corporate 
governance communication, guaranteeing opportunities of comparison. Such a 
condition is particularly significant for energy firms, the success of which is 
determined by the ability to activate and stimulate international relationships and 
influenced by world-scale social and economic phenomena (oil price, energy 
sources, wars and revolts in countries supplying raw materials and services, etc.). 
The importance of sufficiently accurate and detailed recommendations on 
corporate governance communication is confirmed by the empirical research. With 
reference to the eight companies investigated: 
- corporate governance reporting is clearer and more complete when 
guidelines, detailed models or precise recommendations exist; 
- the quantity and the quality of information get worse when leading indications 
decrease. 
 
Moreover, it should be important to go over the focalisation on listed firms, 
typical of current recommendations, in order to adopt a different approach based on 
the protection of all stakeholders in accordance with proper principles of business 
administration direct to protect from different risk typologies. With reference to 
public utilities, for example, environmental and supply risks are inborn in non-
optimum governance. 
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Finally, the effectiveness of corporate governance communication requires a 
business culture oriented to improve constantly the quality of information, on the 
basis of transparency and completeness of the messages divulged to all the 
company stakeholders. The selection of contents has to adequately combine 
mandatory and voluntary ones, according to a defined communication project 
finalised to satisfy informative and evaluational external expectations. 
The research shows different degree of detail from a company to another as 
regards specific contents of corporate governance communication, even 
considering firms of the same country and subject to the same recommendations. 
For instance, Enel – differently from Edison – gives no details in its corporate 
governance report for the year 2005 with reference to the remuneration system, 
although its complexity. Companies have to go over the reticence that seems to 
prevail today, with opaque information on critical contents; on the contrary, firms 
have to communicate transparently to permit that all the stakeholders can assess the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Transparency is in fact a duty, an opportunity and a preliminary condition of 
effectiveness in the relationships between the company and the stakeholders. In this 
regard, the ability of corporate governance boards to combine requirements of 








 In some countries the debate on corporate governance began in the first half of the twentieth 
century, while in other countries – Italy included – business administration has its starting point in 
governance logics. For instance, it is enough to mention Berle and Means’ book of 1932 on The 
modern corporation and private property and the establishment of the Cohen Committee in Great 
Britain in 1945 to understand the importance of corporate governance, which has determined long 
development of the studies on this issue. Since the Nineties, however, corporate governance 
principles have required to be defined again in order to guarantee the effectiveness of company 
direction and control, after heavy corporate scandals all over the world. In Italy, in 1927 Zappa 
defined the firm as a functioning economic coordination, established and directed in order to satisfy 
human needs. See Zappa G. 1927, Tendenze nuove negli studi di ragioneria, Istituto Editoriale 
Scientifico, Milan, p. 30. 
2 
The analysis of company-stakeholder relationships and connected conditions of effectiveness is 
not true; however, its re-examination is quite recent and it is realised by means of a new approach 
based on harmonious governance, social and environmental responsibility, communication, 
intangible assets and links with the management control system. 
Particularly, progressive development of company systems, market globalisation and increasing 
lack of ethics have more and more stressed the need to recover a global vision that puts emphasis on 
the importance of company-stakeholder relationships, setting off the connections among 
expectations, decisions and actions that determine together the corporate evolution. See Salvioni 
D.M. 2004, Efficacia aziendale, processi di governo e risorse immateriali, in Salvioni D.M. (ed.), 
Corporate governance, controllo di gestione e risorse immateriali, FrancoAngeli, Milano, pp. 12-
13. 
3
 Institutional communication is oriented to manage approval as regards how corporate governance 
is exercised and with reference to consequent economic, social and environmental performance. This 
form of communication concerns the company on the whole and it can satisfy all stakeholders’ needs 
of information, if it is properly divulged. 
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4
As regards Spain, the first recommendations on corporate governance communication were 
contained in the Aldama Report (the code of best practices published in 2003) and considered only 
the contents of the corporate governance report. In 2004, the Spanish exchange commission 
(Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) introduced a mandatory format, composed of tables to 
be filled in and questions to be answered. The mandatory format should guarantee complete 
reporting, because lack of information would be noticed even by inexpert readers. 
In Italy, as well as in Spain, recommendations on corporate governance communication have 
become more intensive in time, from 2002 to 2004. At first, Borsa Italiana SpA (the Italian Stock 
Exchange) strengthened its initial recommendations; after that, Assonime and Emittenti Titoli (who 
represent Italian stock companies) have enriched them, introducing also summarising tables in order 
to better the comparability of listed companies’ corporate governance reports. 
5 
The ‘document de référence’, published by French companies at the end of the year, contains all 
economic, accounting and legal information on listed firms. 
The ‘proxy statement’ is the document – published by US firms and transmitted to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission too – by means of which shareholders are informed, convened for the 
general meeting and solicited to vote. The proxy statement contains information on the board of 
directors’ structure, but it neglects the activities actually realised in the year. 
6 
German listed companies must declare in a separate statement the degree of compliance with the 
code of best practices. The company annual report and the website include few details on the 
corporate governance system. 
In Japan, the code of best practices affirms transparency and completeness of disclosure, but it 
doesn’t stress the role of corporate governance communication. No declaration is required to listed 
companies as concerns corporate governance. 
7 
The typical functions of internal committees are: to implement the board of directors’ decisions 
(executive committee); to formulate nomination proposals and to verify independence and integrity 
of candidates and directors (nomination committee); to delineate the most effective remuneration 
system and to propose compensations (remuneration committee); to assist the board in projecting 
and implementing the internal control system (audit committee). Other consultative and proposing 
tasks can be assigned to these committees or to others, intentionally established: for example, a 
committee charged with responsibilities of supervision on the exercise of corporate governance, or 
entrusted with studying, realising and verifying the company strategies. 
8
 It’s important to underline that the interest in corporate governance issues in the United States 
has been awaken by the Enron scandal. 
9
 The best practices of corporate governance recommend listed companies to appoint a lead 
independent director when the chairman of the board is an executive director. The lead independent 
director is an independent member of the board who must coordinate the activities of all the 
independent directors and promote a constructive dialogue with the executive directors. 
10
 The companies with a two-tier system – introduced in 2003 by the Italian law – should divulge 
information on the supervisory board. 
11 
The choice depends on the relevance recognised to compensation issues, since the remuneration 
system is often considered as useful to align directors’ private interests with the shareholders’ 
purposes of value creation. Anyway, expository choices should take in account the evident 
integration of this topic with other details that are published in the corporate governance report or in 
the financial report, in order to obtain complete and coordinate information on remuneration issues
. 
12 
See: Fiori G., Tiscini R. (ed.) 2005, Corporate governance, regolamentazione contabile e 
trasparenza dell’informazione aziendale, FrancoAngeli, Milan, pp. 100-126; Melis A. 1999, 
Corporate governance. Un’analisi empirica della realtà italiana in un’ottica europea, Giappichelli, 
Turin; Charkham J.P. 1994, Keeping good company. A study of corporate governance in five 
countries, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
 
13
 The French share belongs indirectly to Eléctricité de France (through WGRM, totally 
controlled). 
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14
 Chubu is reforming its corporate governance system. Modifications should concern: the board of 
directors composition; the introduction of an advisory board to support the president; appointment 
procedures; separation of powers between directors and officers; mutual young personnel exchange 
between companies inside the Group. 
15
 In the tables, the existence of information is signalled by an ‘x’. The order of countries depend 
on the existence and intensity of recommendations on corporate governance reporting: at first, Italy 
and Spain, then France, Great Britain and the US, and finally Germany and Japan. 
16
 Eléctricité de France states that none of its directors has been convicted of fraud or declared 
bankrupt in the past five years. 
17
 The lack of information can be justified only with reference to implicit aspects of the corporate 
governance system adopted by a company. For example, RWE doesn’t underline that members of its 
management board are executive directors, because this is obvious. 
18
 According to the request of their stock exchanges, British Energy Group and Aquila refer to 
their websites as concerns committee charters. 
19
 Some companies publish details on composition and tasks of the ethics committee, the EHS 
committee, the nuclear power committee and the financial disclosure committee. 
20
 In Iberdrola there is only a committee for both nomination and remuneration. 
21
 According to the agreement signed by the two major shareholders, Edison’s board of directors 
has twelve members. The Italian shareholder Meldi appoints six directors (one of whom 
independent), as well as the French shareholder Eléctricité de France, through WGRM. The same 
ratio is valid to appoint the committee members. Moreover, Meldi appoints the chairman and 
Eléctricité de France appoints the executive director and CEO. 
22
 In tables concerning board committees, italic type is used in case of details the search of which 
depends on the existence of the committee itself. 
23
 According to the shareholders’ agreement, each of the two major shareholders appoints one full 
member and one alternate; the other members are appointed on the basis of lists proposed by 
minority shareholders. The chairman is chosen by the major shareholders between the two full 
members they have appointed. 
24
 In the German system, the audit committee is appointed inside the supervisory board. 
25
 For instance, the following limitations are specified in several internal dealing codes: 
- block periods: the periods in which directors and managers can’t buy and sell company’s shares 
and certificates; these periods usually cover the days immediately before the disclosure of quarter 
and annual results; 
- monetary limits: the global or individual value of transactions that obliges the company to inform 
the market.  
Limits are normally introduced by the national stock exchanges, but companies can apply them in 
a stronger way in the interest of the stakeholders. 
26
 Also the Italian guidelines promoted by Assonime and Emittenti Titoli refers to the notes to the 
financial statements for details, if the company considers them useful. 
27
 According to the most common practice, non-executive and independent directors receive no 
variable compensation, to avoid that they could have a spur to intentionally intervene in operational 
management.  
With reference to Eléctricité de France, it is interesting that the company underlines the 
prohibition to pay variable compensation to the directors appointed by the French State and by the 
employee shareholders. 
